The Legacy of André
VauchezÍ
Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages
Thomas Head
Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY
It is the
appearance of a translation entitled Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages
(trans. Jean Birrell [Cambridge, 1987]) which provides us the excuse this
afternoon to consider the André VauchezÍ masterwork and its legacy
in shaping the hagiographic scholarship over the course of almost two decades.
Vauchez originally published his thèse dÍétat in 1981.
It became on its publication, and remains today, the benchmark for all
study of hagiography and the cult of saints in the later middle ages. The
book is a systematic examination of the records of the formal processes
initiated for the canonization of saints between 1198 and 1431. Vauchez
thus implicitly took up the challenge issued in 1965 by Frantisek Graus
Volk, Herrscher und Heiliger im Reich der Merowinger: Studien zur Hagiographie
der Merowingerzeit (Prague, 1965), that is to use neglected genres
of hagiographic works as sources for the social history of western Christianity.
Given the importance that has come to be accorded GrausÍ pioneering study
among scholars„particularly Anglophone scholars„who examine hagiography
more for social historical than for philological or theological reasons,
it is natural to link the work of the French Catholic to that of the Czech
Marxist. Our chair this afternoon, Richard Kieckhefer„himself one of the
most distinguished Anglophone scholars of late medieval sanctity„made exactly
that connection on the opening page (p. xix) of the foreword which he provided
for the English translation. Vauchez himself invoked Graus on the first
page of his own introduction, but in a much more limited manner, as one
among a group of scholars of the Merovingian and Carolingian periods who
have "made it possible to bring within the ïterritory of the historianÍ
the terra incognita which the history of sanctity has long represented."
(p. 1) It is telling, however, that Vauchez had already made a much more
sweeping act of homage in a very different direction by opening his work
with a quotation from a 1929 review of Hippolyte DelehayeÍs Sanctus:
Essai sur le culte des saints dans lÍAntiquité (Brussels, 1927)
authored by Marc Bloch (in Revue de synthèse, 47 [1929],
p. 89). Vauchez thus managed simultaneously to pay tribute to both
the Bollandistes and the annalistes. His entire oeuvre, from
1981 to the present, can be read as a respectful critique of the immense
resources made available through the efforts of the former by a scholarly
sensibility schooled in the methods of the latter.
The most important source material for VauchezÍ study was found in the
inquests conducted by ecclesiastical officials into the authorization of
saintsÍ cults, that is (to use a term which itself evolved from these very
procedures) canonization. I would argue that the bookÍs most important
theme is the relationship between the Roman curia and local officials.
(This is said in respectful disagreement with Richard Kieckhefer who states
in his foreword to this translation that the book "has as its central
explicit focus the relationship between curial and lay perceptions of sainthood"
[p. xix], which is a subtly, but importantly different matter). By reading
this relationship, Vauchez expounded the ways in which Rome controlled„or
at least attempted to control„the practices of western Christianity. Thus
he persuasively elucidated the experiences of lay Christians through sources
produced by clerics. But laypeople themselves (with the notable exception
of those who became saints) always remained off center stage. Such, it
would seem, is the fate of any study„or any careful study„based on hagiographic
sources.
Vauchez did not, however, simply mine the records of canonization inquests
as the basis for writing a history of various aspects of late medieval
piety. Rather, he carefully interrogated the ways in which these sources
themselves had been produced and how this "process"„with all
the legal, institutional, and literary meaning which the word processus
carried in medieval Latin„had in turn formed ideas about sanctity in the
Christian west. Vauchez thus provided a history of an entire genre and
its accompanying legal institutions, in addition to an analysis of the
evidence which that literature provided. Although it runs a monumental
622 pages of text and notes in the original French edition (a mere 529
in the English translation), Vauchez managed to craft a work which was
both elegant in its style and remarkably concise in its argumentation.
This book still reads with remarkable freshness and immediacy today.
Only a few passages strike me as sounding dated or as having been made
obsolete by subsequent scholarship. Notable in this (negative) sense are
those relatively short passages in which Vauchez attempted to make arguments
based on quantification, with reference to the work of Pitirim Sorokin
(Altruistic Love. A Study of American 'Good Neighbors' and Christian
Saints [Boston, 1950]) and of Pierre Delooz (Sociologie et canonisation
[Collections scientifique de la faculté de Droit de l'Université
de Liège, 30; La Haye, 1969]). Vauchez largely ignored the early
versions of Michael GoodichÍs relatively successful analysis of sanctity
in the thirteenth century (which, although available in several articles,
was only published in its final form in 1982 as Vita perfecta: The Ideal
of Sainthood in the Thirteenth Century [Monographien zür Geschichte
des Mittelalters, 25; Stuttgart, 1982]). The perils of quantification in
the study of sanctity were graphically demonstrated by Donald Weinstein
and Rudolph Bell in their extremely ambitious, quite interesting, yet ultimately
unsuccessful study entitled Saints and Society: The Two Worlds of Western
Christendom, 1000-1500 (Chcicago, 1982). That is a work which enjoyed
an enormous popularity for several years after its publication, but has
in the past decade slowly passed from historiographic view. The problems
of quantification in hagiographic studies are ones which we may well wish
to address further in the discussion this afternoon. It will suffice for
the moment to note that in the intervening years, Vauchez has himself become
a vocal opponent of analysis based on the quantification of evidence derived
from hagiographic sources.
But let us return to the overall success of VauchezÍ book. One matter
which Vauchez brought into clear focus for historians of hagiography, and
of medieval Christianity more generally, was that Christian sanctity was
a social construction. The ecclesiastical hierarchy controlled the means
through which a dead person came to be granted formal recognition as a
saint among communities of living Christians. The power that came from
such formal recognition of sainthood was exploited by members of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy who served as the "impressarios" of the cult of saints.
There was also an historical evolution of those processes of recognition.
The very existence of such procedures implies that sanctity remains one
of those„to use the words of the philosopher John Searle„"objective
facts in the world that are only facts by human agreement" and which
in turn become the "building blocks" of a constructed social
reality (The Social Construction of Reality [New York, 1995], p.
1). For the historian, rather than the theologian, there can be no absolute
essence to the ideals of sanctity. Indeed the very ideals according to
which official judgments about sainthood were made themselves developed
and mutated. Martyrdom was a virtually necessary component of sanctity
in the second century, only to be replaced by the ideals of asceticism
and later poverty in centuries dominated by monks and mendicant friars.
Such collective ideals permeated contemporary descriptions of, as well
as expectations for, individual saints. Medieval Christian hagiography
was thus in one sense nothing more and nothing less than the construction
of the templates of sanctity.
At the heart of VauchezÍ enterprise is the means by which the formal
designation of sainthood was constructed out of a variety of ideals of
sanctity. In these matters, English is a richer and more subtle language
than French, having two distinct terms. Both ideas are, of course, expressed
in French simply as sainteté. The translator of VauchezÍ
book, Jean Birrell, is exactly on target with his rendering of sainteté
in the title as "sainthood." Throughout the work he intelligently
chooses between the two possibilities. It should be noted in passing that,
despite this success, there are some distinct problems with the translation.
Most significant of these„as Colin Morris has recently pointed out in his
review published in a recent Times Literary Supplement (April 10,
1991)„is the rendering of mentalité commune as "popular
mind." But that is another matter which we may wish to address in
the discussion.
I wish, for the few minutes remaining to me, to focus on the historical
development of the formal means by which the western Church publically
recognized sainthood. In the opening section of his book, Vauchez provided
a clear sketch of that history, from the public acclamation of certain
martyrs in the early church, through the requirement of episcopal approval
for the translation of saintsÍ relics and thus of the inauguration of public
cults which was laid down at a number councils of the late antique and
Carolingian periods, to the full flowering of papal canonization. What
interests Vauchez in this story is the development of the papal reservation
of the right of canonization. The first bull of canonization was issued
by John XV for Bishop Ulric of Augsburg in 993, but it took some two centuries
for this process to become widespread. Indeed, as Vauchez himself puts
it (p. 24), it was only "During the second half of the twelfth century
[that] papal canonization began to compete with episcopal translation and
then to surpass it." The canonization processus or inquest
developed as the support for papal declarations of sainthood only slowly
over the course of the twelfth century. The pontificate of Innocent III
proved in this, as in so many matters, the decisive period in the institutionalization
of papal perogatives. And so, the "late middle ages" of VauchezÍ
rigorous study begin in 1198. Episcopal authorization of sainthood and
cults, of course, continued throughout the late middle ages, as the opposing
force in the dialectical play between the Roman and the local. Vauchez
significantly realized in 1981 a fact that all too many scholars still
ignore: there was no single form of sainthood. Rather there were many way„local
and curial, popular and official„in which the holy dead could come to be
recognized as saints. Moreover, this multiplicity is not at all accurately
reflected in the formal distinction, made increasingly rigid through the
later middle ages, between sancti and beati. It is this very
multiplicity of meaning not just to sanctity, but to sainthood which makes
any quantified analysis of material related to saints and hagiography problematic,
because the scholar is often threatened with comparing incomparable data,
that is in essence comparing apples and oranges. Having recognized this
historical formation of different categores of sainthood, Vauchez went
on, with a few exceptions noted above, to make careful and sound generalizations
about the polysemous meanings of sanctity. Just because sainthood is a
socially constructed and historically unstable category, or rather set
of categories, does not mean that the scholar has to go so far as, say,
Aviad Kleinberg who in Prophets in their Own Country: Living Saints
and the Making of Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages (Chicago, 1992),
after a rather gratuitous and not wholly accurate critique of VauchezÍ
work, eschewed generalization in favor of thick description and individual
saintly figures and their local circumstances.
There remains a problem, however. We simply do not understand sufficiently
the varied procedures for the authorization of sainthood during the centuries
before 1100 or how papal canonization came to challenge those procedures
during the twelfth century. VauchezÍ forty-nine pages on the development
down to 1198 of what he calls "la discipline du culte des saints"
(here I do not think the English translation of "the control of the
cult of saints" quite catches the Foucauldian ring of the original)
remains today the only general treatment of the subject published since
Eric KempÍs Canonisation and Authority in the Western Church (Oxford,
1948). Moreover, both Vauzhez and KempÍs treatments of the subject are
marred by the teleological assumption implicit in their very terminology„indeed
implicit in the terminology which we all share„that the procedures for
the official recognition of sainthood would develop into those of papal
canonization.
The term canonizare first appeared, with reference to sainthood,
in the second quarter of the eleventh century, but it did not become remotely
common until the twelfth century. That much is common knowledge. What is
less recognized is the specificity of the term. I have done a relatively
thorough search for uses of the term down through the thirteenth century.
It was only used in reference to the papacy, as when Abbot Ulric around
1123 described Conrad of Constance as canonizanda cum sedis apostolicae
praesertim crebris jam dudum interpellassem litteris (Vita s. Conradi
in MGH, SS, 4:430). I would argue that the term "papal canonization"
is in effect a pleonasm. Its etymology would seem not to have been the
registering of a dead holy person in catalogo sanctorum, but rather
a declaration of a personÍs sainthood apud canones by the pope or
curia. In 1139 Osbern of Clare apparently saw canonization and the catalogue
of saints as two separate categories when he wrote that Edward the Confessor
was canonizatum in catalogo sanctorum a Romana secum curia (Epistolae
[Oxford, 1929], no. 19). My point is that papal canonization did not develop
out of episcopal procedures for recognizing sainthood. Rather papal canonization
was a separate legal and conceptual category which was developed separately.
We threaten to misread episcopal procedures when we describe them anachronistically
and teleogically in terms of canonization.
I would argue that the papacy did not develop canonization as a substitute
for episcopal procedures. Rather canonization represented a curial attempt
to deal with and control a relatively new and expanding problem. It has
often been remarked, inter alia by Vauchez himself, that the procedures
of canonization tended to follow relatively quickly on the demise of the
holy person in question. There is strong evidence for more than sixty cases
in which the papacy issued a bull or otherwise authorized a cult between
the original bull for Ulric in 993 and the end of the papacy of Alexander
IV in 1261. Only three of those cases involved saints who lived before
the year 1000. The first was the canonization in 1165 of the emperor Charlemagne
by the anti-pope Paschal III at the request of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa.
The second occurred in 1172 when Cardinal Hyacinth, a papal legate, confirmed
the the cult of Rosendo of Mondonedo (d. 977). The third dates to the following
year and the same legatine mission, when Hyacinth examined and then authorized
the translation of the newly discovered relics of the allegedly ancient
martyrs Claudius, Lupercus, and Victoricus in Léon. Hyacinth later
confirmed both actions with formal bulls after he rose to the papal throne
as Celestin III. The fourth was the canonization in 1233 of Bishop Virgil
of Salzburg (d. 784) by Pope Gregory IX. It is clear that, particularly
outside the mind Celestin III, that canonization was associated with the
authorization of cults for saints of relatively modern vintage.
Let us remind ourselves that the recognition of such saints of modern
vintage was a change from previous practice which itself evolved over these
same centuries. To be sure, in early Christianity and in the barbarian
kingdoms it was common to recognize recently-dead holy persons as saints.
As Pierre Riché and others have pointed out, however, in the Carolingian
empire it was exceedingly unusual to allow such cults, except on the missionary
fringes of the Empire, where the cults of recent martyrs such as Boniface
were not only allowed but encouraged. The Carolingian hierarchy, both secular
and ecclesiastical, did not want to encourage any sort of charismatic authority
in living holy people which might serve as a challenge to their own power.
That same hierarchy clearly asserted its right to control the cults of
any and all saints. There is surprisingly little reference to the cult
of saints in the voluminous surviving Carolingian religious legislation.
That is because the Carolingian idea of authority in these matters was
so consistent and simple.
In the Admonitio Generalis of 789 (MGH, Concilia, 1:56), and
five years later at the council of Frankfurt (MGH, Capitularia, 1:76),
canons were issued which required that there must be a reliable textual
guarantee for the sanctity of any person who recieved public veneration.
While episcopal authority in these matters was implicit, it was not clarified
until 811 when Charlemagne ordered that anyone who translated relics from
one place to another must be able to satisfy the bishop as to their authenticity.
Then at the council of Mainz in 813 (MGH, Concilia, 2.1:272) it was ordered,
"Henceforth let no one presume to move the bodies of saints from one
place to another without the council of the prince or licence from a holy
synod of bishops." At Mainz, the bishops also offered practical suggestions
concerning the commemoration of saints. They offered a lengthy list of
feasts pertaining to saints of universal importance (such as Stephen, Peter,
and Paul) which ought to be observed everywhere; they further declared
that the feasts of those "martyrs and confessors whose sacred bodies
rest" in a given diocese ought to be observed in that region. Taken
together these canons suggested two pairs of principles. First, they decreed
that a bishop controlled the commemoration of saints in his diocese, but
that regional synods and/or the king himself could share in the authorization
of new cults. Secondly they established that, in addition to certain saints
of universal importance, saints of more local significance ought to be
commemorated in the dioceses which housed their shrines, but that the veneration
of such local saints must be firmly grounded in textual guarantees.
There were, of course, many new cults of saints inaugurated over the
course of the ninth, tenth and early eleventh century. These were not,
however, the cults of new saints. They were by and large cults associated
with newly translated or newly discovered relics of allegedly ancient saints.
A survey of translatio and inventio accounts from these centuries
indicates that the canon of the council of Mainz was followed with extraordinary
consistency. When the relics of a saint named Celsus were discovered in
978 during the reconstruction of the church of St. Eucharius in Trier,
Archbishop Egbert followed the guidelines laid down at Mainz. He used the
meager funerary inscription on CelsusÍ sarcophagus as an authorizing text
for the cult of this presumed ancient bishop of Trier and sought confirmation
for his decision from his fellow bishops and his princeps, Otto
II, at a council held in the imperial palace at Ingelheim. He also made
a significant innovation, supplementing these traditional methods with
an application of the ordeal by fire to authenticate the relics in question.
This use of the ordeal, almost always performed under episcopal authority,
became wide-spread over the next two centuries as a means of authenticating
the newly-discovered relics of ancient saints. (For a full consideration,
see my article, "Art and Artifice in Ottonian Trier," Gesta,
36 [1997], pp. 65-82.) Only a few decades after Egbert had undertaken the
inventio of the relics of Celsus, bishop Liudolph of Augsburg decided
to commence the veneration of one of his predeccessors in his episcopal
see as a saint. What distinguished St. Ulric of Augsburg from St. Celsus
of Trier was that he had died only a few years before. Like Egbert, Liudolph
wished to follow the guidelines laid down in canon 51 of the council of
Mainz, and therefore sought permission from his princeps. But Liudolph
interpreted them in a different way, and petitioned Pope John XV for the
first papal bull of canonization (Mansi 19:169-72). A similar papally approved
canonization took place in Trier for a recently deceased holy man only
a few decades later. By the time of Alexander III the cults of "modern"
saints had become common, and with it papal canonization. papal canonization
had middle of the thirteenth century, such a process had become the norm.
Indeed Gratian had already inserted the above-mentioned canon from the
council of Mainz in his Decretum on the assumption that the princeps
in question was the pope, not the secular ruler as its authors had doubtless
intended it to be and as Egbert had interpreted it to mean.
By the time of Alexander III, the use of the ordeal by fire to authenticate
relics and thus authorize the cult of long dead saints had in essence been
banned. Evidence as to why the ritual was abandoned may be found in a text
from the English priory of Stone (Historia fundationis prioratus Stonensis
in William Dugdale, Monasticon Anglicanum [London, 1830], 6:226-30).
It seems that doubts arose concerning the veneration of Wulfadus and Rufinus,
two martyred members of an Anglo-Saxon royal family whose relics were enshrined
at Stone. The monks sent one of their number, bearing the head of Wulfadus,
to Rome to have both saints canonized (the term canonizare is used)
by the pope. Having arrived at the curia, the English monk offered to subject
the relic to the ordeal by fire, but the pontiff (who remains unnamed in
this account) refused to permit such a ritual. He first objected, "You
should not tempt the Lord, your God" (Mt 4:7) and then claimed that
no sanction for an ordeal of any kind could be found in canon law, further
noting that ordeals were "superstitious."
I would suggest that papal canonization developed first as a means of
dealing with the relatively new (or renewed) problem posed by modern saints
such as Ulric of Augsburg. It took centuries for canonization to be viewed,
as it was by the monks of Stone and as it is still by modern scholars,
as a norm for the authorization of sainthood. We know that the papacy
in a sense triumphed through the imposition of canonization. And we know
an enormous amount more about the construction of sanctity in the later
middle ages because of André VauchezÍ research into the records
of canonization. But we still do not understand why the methods pioneered
in the late tenth century by Liudolph of Augsburg rather than those developed
by Egbert of Trier came to be dominant. That is a subject for further research.
Note: This paper was presented at the 33rd International
Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo MI (May 8, 1998) as part of a roundtable
organized by the Hagiography Society entitled "The Legacy of André
Vauchez' Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages.
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